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Abstract 
We have assembled a unique loan-level performance dataset for 
mortgages originated in the UK to study the differences in default 
likelihood between loans of varying borrower and loan characteristics. 
We can broadly confirm the relevance of most commonly known risk-
factors and find that most drivers of default for prime are also relevant 
for non-conforming, drivers of repossessions are largely similar to 
drivers of arrears and information on adverse borrower information 
dominates any other risk factor. Our study provides many more details 
and compares results with recent studies for the US and other European 
countries.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The global recession which started with the deterioration of the US subprime 
mortgage market late 2006 has expanded into virtually every developed country in the 
world. Particularly, most of the once booming housing markets across the globe have 
now undergone a severe period of distress, with most countries reporting decline in 
house prices, increase in mortgage defaults and contraction of the house building 
sector. While the economic stress poses significant strain to both institutions as well 
as individuals, the downturn environment also creates opportunities to study financial 
behaviour under exceptional situations. These studies are important to understand 
financial market behaviour and develop effective risk modelling and risk control 
procedures. This paper focuses on default behaviour in the UK mortgage market, 
during the recent period of economic stress.  
 
Public studies on stress in the mortgage market have largely been limited by data 
availability. Studies for European markets have mainly drawn on aggregate data from 
national account statistics and longitudinal panel data. They focus on identifying the 
impact of select indicators of default, particularly the degree of equity of the 
borrowers they hold in their properties and the ability to pay ongoing mortgage 
instalments. The data limitations typically allow only for a time-series analysis on 
aggregate information; e.g. explaining market-wide default rates with national level 
equity holdings and average mortgage affordability. Other macro-economic indicators 
are also taken into account, such as GDP growth and the unemployment rate. The 
alternative of using panel data has its limitations in the limited number of risk 
indicators that are typically tracked in longitudinal surveys. Especially product 
features of the mortgage loans are rarely available from these data sets.  
 
Studies on loan-level accounts specifically designed to identify mortgage risk drivers 
are more effective in providing insights into relative default risks. Studies on this type 
of data have mainly been limited to the US where historical performance data on a 
loan-level are compiled and made available to the public by third-party institutions. 
The availability of such data is largely determined by the regulatory framework, in 
particular data protection regulation and data sharing conventions. The data sets 
available for the US contain detailed information for a large set of loans well 
representing the overall market as well as all major regional areas and product types 
and provide a history of performance over more than a decade. This is not yet 
available for any European mortgage market. Our study attempts to arrive at a similar 
depth of insight for the UK with a dataset that comes as close to the information 
available in the US as possible.  
 
We have assembled a unique loan-level performance dataset for mortgages originated 
in the UK to study the differences in default likelihood between loans of varying 
characteristics such as borrower type (e.g. self-employment, adverse credit 
information, etc.) and various different product types (e.g. self-certification, loan-to-
value ratio, interest rate, buy-to-let, etc.). Data comprise loan-originations from prime 
and non-conforming lenders over the period 2004 to 2007 with default information 
available up until March 2009. Since the majority of default observations relate to the 
period after the onset of the credit crisis in the second half of 2007 our study distinctly 
focuses on drivers of relative risk during a period of economic stress, during which 
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GDP contracted and unemployment rose. It does not attempt at identifying macro-
economic indicators for the prediction of market-wide default rates.  
 
Our study provides useful insight into the drivers of default among UK mortgages 
under a distressed economic environment. In a first step it provides valuable insight 
into typical characteristics that are particularly correlated with default. We then also 
show via a multivariate logistic regression to what degree patterns identified in the 
univariate analysis of risk drivers remain valid when considering the simultaneous 
interaction of those risk factors. In addition, we compare the result from the prime 
sector with those from the non-conforming sector and find that apart from the 
indicators of adverse credit (which are unique to the non-conforming sector) the major 
default drivers are broadly the same. For the non-conforming sector we also compare 
results from delinquencies with those from repossessions and thereby draw 
conclusions about the relative likelihood of a loan curing once it has fallen into 
delinquency and differentiate by borrower and product type.  
1.1 Key findings  
 
Our key findings can be summarised as follows:  
 Most drivers of default for prime are also relevant for non-conforming (e.g. 
original loan-to-value ratio, debt-to-income ratio, interest-only loans, self-
employment).  
 An exception seems to be fast track mortgages in the prime sector which do not 
appear generically more risky than income verified loans, while self-certification 
mortgages in the non-conforming sector invariably turn out more risky than those 
originated with certified income. On these grounds it looks doubtful that fast track 
processing in UK prime lending is generically comparable to self-certification in 
the non-conforming sector.  
 Drivers of repossessions are largely similar to drivers of arrears, though some 
variables (such as the debt-to-income ratio) seem to have lower explanatory power 
on repossessions while others have higher explanatory power (buy-to-let and 
right-to-buy).  
 Adverse borrower information dominates any other risk factor. This is consistent 
with the market convention to separate prime from non-conforming originations.  
 Despite the limited time span of our data history we can also identify some trends 
of risk indicators over time. For example, we clearly see problems with new build 
properties for the vintages 2006 and 2007 (which can be attributed to a loosening 
of underwriting procedures) and an increasing impact of self-employment on 
defaults (which can be attributed to self-employed individuals being more 
vulnerable to general economic deterioration compared to employees).  
 
1.2 Literature Review 
Most of the studies reviewed in this section focus on aggregate macro level data to 
explain underlying default rates. Some of them also focus on direct causes of default 
(such as divorce or illness) rather than identifying predictive risk factors available 
long before the default event. In contrast to these studies we use a proprietary loan-
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level dataset on the performance of mortgages originated in the UK non-conforming 
and the prime sector between 2004 and 2007. The time period also allows us to 
investigate changes in underwriting procedures that may have increased the riskiness 
of particular products over time and contributed to defaults in the current crisis. Most 
of the UK based literature that we are aware of dates back to repossessions in the 
1990s recession (e.g. Figuera, Glen and Nellis, 2005).  
 
Many UK studies using macroeconomic data identify key drivers of mortgage default 
to be interest rates, unemployment, marriage breakdowns, small business failure, 
income and expenditure problems (see for example, Doling, Ford and Stafford, 1998; 
Ford, Kempson and Wilson, 1995). There are some studies however that focus more 
on systematic differences between borrowers in terms of equity or the level of debt 
they have acquired to explain default behaviour. This literature generally focuses on 
two competing theories of mortgage default drivers.4 The first is termed ‘equity’ 
theory and is based on the willingness to pay. The borrower’s perception of the 
magnitude of their own equity, or wealth, invested in the property significantly affects 
the likelihood of default when the borrower is in financial distress. (Whitley, 
Windram and Cox, 2004; Hellebrandt, Kawar and Waldron, 2009; Lambrecht, 
Perraudin and Satchell, 1997; Figuera, Glen and Nellis, 2005 and Breedon and Joyce, 
1992). This is supported in US based studies using loan-level data (see for example, 
Jackson and Kaserman, 1980). It is not clear, however, to what degree this 
phenomenon transfers to other countries as the limited recourse of lenders to 
borrowers’ assets other than the property that is securing the loan is particular to 
numerous US states but practically unknown throughout Europe. In addition, some 
research argues that while household equity can play an important role in increasing 
the probability of default, it does not in itself cause default (May and Tudela, 2005).  
 
The second theory which is found in the literature is based on the ‘ability-to-pay’. 
Households that take on large amounts of debt relative to their disposable income 
should be more likely to face difficulties in making payments in the case of an 
adverse shock (e.g. interest rate rises, loss of income, unemployment etc.). A study on 
US cross-sectional loan level-data originated in 1969 (Jackson and Kaserman, 1980) 
however, finds that only the loan-to-value ratio was significant, while the interest rate 
variable (reflective potentially of debt-service) was insignificant. However, this 
finding may be less relevant for the UK case where a large proportion of loans are on 
variable rate. Most UK based studies seem to suggest that the debt-service ratio is a 
strong indicator of mortgage arrears (see for example, Brookes, Dicks and Pradhan, 
2004; Whitley, Windram and Cox, 2004).  
 
Most studies due to the way data are available, examine arrears rates as a proxy for 
repossession rates. However, the relationship between the two is not necessarily 
linear. The assumption made in many studies is that the characteristics of loans in 
arrears would not differ from the loans that are repossessed. There are, however, loans 
that do not transition from delinquency to repossession but cure. Being in arrears is 
often a temporary status and as argued by Ambrose, Buttimer and Capone (1997) has 
a value of delay, providing the borrower time to sort out financial problems and cure 
                                                 
4
 Lambrecht, Perraudin and Satchell (1997) suggest that the two theories are not distinct. This is 
because not only can short-run fluctuations in income influence default, but due to the fact that a 
default does not erase the debt to the lender, the level of equity a borrower has will also influence the 
default decision. 
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the loan. Some borrowers may sell the property and prepay the mortgage. An 
important determinant of this is whether the borrower has equity in the house and 
therefore stands to lose this equity if the property were repossessed. Households with 
negative equity because the property value (potentially due to house price declines) is 
lower than the mortgage loan are very likely to default. In contrast, households with 
significant equity may find a way out of the payment difficulties by either selling the 
properties or by withdrawing equity from the property and refinance with another 
lender. A necessary condition for this is that credit constraints do not limit the 
opportunity to refinance.  
 
Survey research by Coles (1992) also sheds some light on drivers of arrears and 
repossession. Coles using a survey of UK lenders from December 1991, finds that 
arrears are mostly associated with unemployment or other income shocks. Moreover, 
those experiencing arrears were mostly either self-employed, working in the 
construction industry or else in a commission based business. The paper also finds 
that 60% of loans in six months or more arrears are still able to make a significant 
repayment i.e. they may not necessarily default. The survey also found that 
repossessions were instigated after about six months of being in arrears.  
 
Our study focuses on both arrears and repossessions of loans. Given the different 
routes loans in arrears can take, we argue that some variables may have a stronger 
effect on repossession compared to arrears. This hypothesis is driven by the 
conjecture that different types of loans have a different tendency to roll on from 
arrears into repossession. For instance, lenders may be quick to repossess high loan-
to-value loans which they do not expect will be able to refinance or cure. While we do 
not have sufficient data to directly test on roll rates of loans with various 
characteristics, we are able to draw conclusions from a comparison of risk factors 
between the arrears data and the repossession data available to us.  
 
There is little research on the UK mortgage market that focuses on specific borrower 
characteristics as determinants of default. A few recent publications which focus on 
the US subprime market have highlighted the poor credit profile of borrowers and 
their low credit scores as one of the strongest drivers of default in the recent subprime 
crisis (see for example, Mayer, Pence and Shurland, 2009 and Demyanyk and Hemert, 
2009). We expect that this phenomenon is prevalent also for the recent credit crisis in 
the UK. Borrowers who in the past had difficulties in managing their finances were 
able to obtain mortgages in the non-conforming sector. We expect that such 
individuals are more likely to fall into arrears or to be repossessed in the current 
downturn.   
 
Similarly borrowers with volatile income streams should be more susceptible to 
economic cycles. In this respect we focus on borrower’s employment status. Coles 
(1992) finds evidence that self employed borrowers are more likely to fall into arrears. 
Intuitively, borrowers who earn a fixed monthly salary and enjoy stronger protection 
from regulation are more likely to be able to continue with their monthly mortgage 
payments than self employed borrowers who generate income from their own 
business and are more dependent on the respective market conditions. Therefore self-
employed borrowers should be more susceptible to economic cycles and interruption 
of their business.  
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A large extant of literature focusing on the US subprime crisis has examined whether 
specific product features were important drivers of default and delinquencies. The US 
literature shows that product characteristics had a relatively smaller impact on loan 
performance (Demyanyk and Hemert, 2009). Among the product characteristics, 
balloon mortgages had the highest probability of default, while fixed rate mortgages 
showed the best performance. This effect, as the authors argue, could be a self-
selection bias, with the best borrowers selecting fixed rate mortgages. Interest-only 
loans in the UK operate similarly but not exactly like balloon mortgages in the US. 5 
They are also common in both prime and non-conforming market taking up around 
approximately 30% and 50% respectively in each market sector. This has however, 
declined substantially during 2008.  
 
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows: section 2 provides a broad overview 
of the UK mortgage market, its evolution since the early-1990s recession and recent 
developments; section 3 describes the data set and key summary statistics; section 4 
presents univariate and multivariate analyses; section 5 summarises and concludes.  
 
2 UK MARKET OVERVIEW  
 
2.1 Historic Development  
The UK mortgage market is one of the most sophisticated and competitive in Europe 
and is characterised by its prime, sub-prime and non-conforming sectors. 
Traditionally, residential mortgages in the UK were provided by building societies. 
However, following changes in legislation in the 1980s, banks, insurance companies 
and other lenders were able to enter the mortgage market. These new entrants 
introduced new mortgage products and expanded lending to market segments not 
catered for prior to the deregulation, which ultimately resulted in the diversity of 
borrower and product types known to current observers of the market.  
 
The subprime market was established in the aftermath of the housing recession of 
1990-93 which had the effect of creating a demand for mortgages among borrowers 
who had previously defaulted on a loan or had otherwise experienced financial 
problems and had adverse information on their credit record. during the last recession 
of the early 1990s, i.e. at a time when banks and building societies, had suffered 
substantial losses on their lending books, capacity and willingness to lend to such 
borrowers was limited. As a result, specialised lenders filled the void and launched 
the subprime market by offering loans to borrowers with adverse credit history. They 
originated mortgages through intermediaries rather than branch networks and funded 
themselves by wholesale debt usually borrowed from investment banks rather than by 
retail deposits.  
 
The companies that pioneered the development of the subprime market in the early 
1990s have also been pivotal in innovating other products in the UK mortgage market, 
such as loans for self employed applicants, temporary contractors who could self-
certify their income, and also employed borrowers who may have more than one job 
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 Such loans are characterised by a bullet capital payment at maturity of the mortgage, with only 
interest payments being made through the life of the mortgage. 
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or source of income. They have also been instrumental in developing the buy-to-let 
(BTL) market, where the borrower’s ability to repay the loans was measured on the 
basis of future rent rather than their own income. By the early 2000s these types 
together with the subprime segment were collectively known as non-conforming.6  
 
As competition around subprime lending grew specialised lenders who initially 
started off by catering for subprime borrowers expanded their range to offer loans to 
borrowers with only limited adverse credit (also known as ‘near prime’). At the same 
time prime lenders, in search for higher yields, also broadened the range of borrowers 
they would accept and also started to issue loans with limited adverse credit 
information.  
 
This expansion of the UK mortgage market, in combination with the increased 
number of participants, intensified competition, which, prior to August 2007, was a 
fundamental driver behind the general relaxation of underwriting criteria employed by 
lenders specifically within the non-conforming sector.  
 
2.2 Underwriting Standards  
In the prime sector mortgages are typically underwritten using credit scoring models 
developed individually by each lender. The features that each lender considers when 
building a scorecard differ from lender to lender. Generally however, prime lenders’ 
score cards will take into account the explicit credit history of an applicant as well as 
factors that behaviourally are felt to contribute to a higher or lower likelihood of 
default. Credit features that would typically be considered include the amount of 
County Court Judgments (CCJ), Bankruptcy Orders (BO) Individual Voluntary 
Arrangements (IVA) and prior mortgage arrears as well as payment history of 
unsecured lending (such as personal loans/credit cards and hire purchase agreements). 
Behavioural characteristics that would generally be considered include whether the 
borrower is on the electoral register, the applicant’s age, and the age gap between the 
two applicants if the applicant is a joint applicant. Typically, lenders in the prime 
market would not allow BOs/IVAs, significant CCJs or prior mortgage arrears, and 
performance on payments on other lending would be factored into the scorecard. 
Indications of poor past performance would lead to a lower score and therefore 
increase the likelihood of a decline decision. 
 
The vast majority of UK subprime mortgages were not underwritten using credit 
scoring models. Instead, loans were either manually underwritten or, where 
automation was used, it was rather deployed to assign a loan application to a 
particular product type. This level of automation did not attempt to look at other 
personal details of the applicant, for example whether the borrower is on the electoral 
register. Generally, where credit scoring was used in subprime it was used as a tool to 
dictate the level of scrutiny an application will receive at the manual underwriting 
stage, it was not used to make the decision.  
 
                                                 
6
 Non-conforming products include loans to subprime borrowers (borrowers with materially adverse 
credit history), second charge loans, loans for which borrowers self certified their income; loans 
secured on BTL; right-to-buy and lifetime or equity release loans. 
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2.3 Current Crisis 
The UK mortgage market has undergone significant changes due to the unprecedented 
liquidity crisis which broke in August 2007, following increasing concerns over the 
performance of US sub-prime mortgages. The subsequent disruptions to the global 
financial markets caused all lenders to substantially revise their mortgage origination 
practices.  
 
The liquidity problems of banks and the general change in global investor appetite 
forced large parts of the non-conforming sector to stop lending. The prime market 
continued issuance of loans, albeit at much tighter lending criteria and at higher 
margins over the refinancing rate. In terms of underwriting criteria, the most prevalent 
reaction has been the reduction of LTV ratios lenders are prepared to lend against.  
 
This tightening of lending criteria has been viewed as positive for performance of 
future originations, but this unprecedented disruption to the mortgage market has the 
side effect of causing defaults of existing borrowers on riskier products. This is in 
marked contrast to the situation during 2004 to 2007 where strong house price 
appreciation and an easy availability of credit meant that even those borrowers with 
severe credit problems or those on riskier mortgage products would have had no 
difficulty in refinancing once their discount period ended to lock in a cheaper ‘teaser’ 
rate. Past data on severe delinquencies and defaults analysed by Fitch Ratings 
indicates that the majority of subprime borrowers who fell behind in their payments 
had been able to remortgage their way out of problems by withdrawing additional 
equity from their house. With a tightening of the mortgage market and the significant 
contraction in house prices, many borrowers found themselves unable to do so and 
defaulted on their mortgage. 
 
A distinct characteristic of the recent UK market is the significant growth in 
residential mortgages solely underwritten on the rental income of the property, rather 
than the borrower income. Such mortgages have been termed ‘buy-to-let’ loans and 
have been growing in popularity since their inception in 1996 up until the onset of the 
credit crisis in Q4 2007 where they constituted 13% of all gross mortgage advances. 
The buy-to-let sector enjoyed stronger growth during the boom phase and, like all 
non-conforming products, suffered a sharper decline in volumes than the prime 
conforming sector. Prior to the crisis market observers were divided over whether 
buy-to-let mortgages constitute higher or lower risk than owner-occupier mortgages. 
Buy-to-let investors tend to be older and more financially savvy, with a long-term 
investment aim in mind. On the other hand, property investors also tended to exhibit 
higher debt leverage and are exposed to the fate of the rental sector. We do not share 
the popular view that buy-to-let investors are hedged against house price declines 
which is based on the theory that, during a downturn, the population turns demand 
towards renting rather than owning as long as house prices are decreasing, because 
this is based on the questionable assumption that housing demand does not decrease 
as a whole during a downturn. Rather, we expect buy-to-let mortgages to perform in 
parallel to the business cycle, i.e. lower default probability than owner-occupiers in an 
economically benign environment and worse in a downturn. 
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3 DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
We collected a unique dataset on over 500,000 mortgage loans drawn from UK 
residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) rated by Fitch Ratings. Most of our 
dataset relates to originations between 2004 and 2007. For comparison, all mortgage 
loan advances in the UK over the same period amounted to close to GBP10 million; 
this is combining remortgages and house purchases as well as the prime and the non-
conforming sector.  
 
The data set includes information on loan and borrower characteristics from the time 
of origination. In addition, we have the latest performance information on the loan, 
i.e. its worst arrears status since origination until March 2009, the time of default or 
the time of prepayment. 
 
The available mortgage pools contain originations since 2000 by a variety of UK 
lenders in the prime and non-conforming sectors. The data are representative of the 
overall market, as they cover a wide spectrum of loans ranging from prime to non-
conforming lenders. For non-conforming loans, we have two separate datasets, first 
where performance information was recorded in terms of repossessions 
(‘repossessions information’) and second where performance information was 
recorded in terms of number of months in arrears (‘arrears information’). We report 
summary statistics and analyses for each dataset separately.  
 
3.1 Coverage of Dataset 
Table 1 A & B show the number of loans in the dataset by transaction for non-
conforming and prime, respectively. Each loan defines one performance observation, 
i.e. repossession or worst arrears status. Transactions by the same originator are 
subsumed under a single name, typically the name of the originator or the 
securitisation programme. For example, there are several Bluestone transactions 
included, which we report as a single dataset for Bluestone transaction series as in 
Table 2. We received arrears information on loan level data on four master trust 
transactions7 backed by prime mortgages as shown in  Table 1B.  
 
The data cover loans originated since 2000 (see Table 3). The bulk of the observations 
stem from originations between 2004 and 2007. The concentration by vintage is 
particularly strong for the non-conforming sector which experienced large growth 
during this period. On the prime side, the distribution of loans is more spread out by 
origination vintage.  
 
Most of the repossession information comes from loans that were repossessed in 2007 
and 2008 (see Table 4).  
 
                                                 
7
 Master Trusts are structured transactions which allow for continuous revolution of the underlying 
pool and periodic issuance of additional notes. Most UK RMBS and Consumer ABS Master Trusts are 
maintained by large commercial banks or building societies and contain several hundered thousands of 
loans.  
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3.2 Biases, Imperfections and Solutions  
 
Due to the differing reporting standards and internal standards among lenders we were 
faced with the challenge of dealing with partly incomplete data. For the sake of clarity 
we refrained from imputing missing data and preferred to base univariate and 
multivariate analyses on as many available observations as possible. This means that 
analyses including risk factors that are not populated for all observations are limited 
to the subset of observations on which all risk factors are available.  
 
Note that the selection of loans according to eligibility criteria for the securitisation 
and the self-selection of securitising banks may lead to biases not visible to us 
compared to typical mortgage pools held by banks. In particular, our study does not 
attempt to identify drivers of early delinquencies since securitised loans typically have 
seasoned at least a few months before being included into a transaction. The 
provisions of a securitisation normally include restrictions as to their arrears status. 
Hence, early delinquencies are typically excluded from securitisations and are not 
captured in the data available to us.  
 
Whilst being one of the most comprehensive datasets compiled on the UK mortgage 
market the data exhibit a few imperfections which we will address during the 
analysis: 
(1) We lack adequate performance data on buy-to-let loans originated by prime 
lenders. Therefore, any conclusions drawn on buy-to-let loans are 
representative of the non-conforming sector only.  
(2) We lack data on repossessions for prime loans, therefore a comparison 
between drivers of repossessions vis-à-vis arrears is restricted to the non-
conforming sector.  
(3) For three transactions we have only been provided with repossession data and 
for five transactions only the arrears status. We will separate analysis on 
different performance indicators and draw conclusions on the difference in 
section 4.2.1. 
(4) There are a small percentage of non-conforming loans for which we were 
provided with both repossession and arrears information. The limited 
conclusions that can be drawn from this dataset are reported in section 4.2.1. 
(5) Due to the different mix of originators in the dataset, some of the results are 
bound to be driven by differences in underwriting. We try to control for these 
effects in the multivariate analysis via dummy variables. However, such 
technical correction does not capture more delicate bias such as resulting from 
occasional changes to underwriting practices of one lender over time.  
 
As evident from the above, we separately study performance according to two 
different measures of default, based on availability of the performance measure.  
 
First, we use a proxy default measure for loans that have ever been in arrears for more 
than three months in their life (henceforth referred to as 90ever). Arrears are broadly 
defined as the shortfall on scheduled payments past one month. This measure has 
several advantages. It serves as a leading indicator of the default event, which is 
typically referred to as unlikely to pay. This measure allows us to capture the risk of a 
loan at an early stage as enforcement proceedings are typically at a later stage and 
depend on the speed with which lenders decide to foreclose the property. This way we 
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can capture loans from recent origination vintages which have yet to be repossessed 
but have already fallen into arrears.  
 
Second, we use information on actual repossessions. This measure is more closely 
related to the enforcement stage and ignores loans that cure, i.e. loans that repay the 
overdue amounts, resume continued payment and can thus be treated as performing 
loans again, and loans that prepay prior to the property being repossessed. Due to the 
late stage at which repossessions are recorded fewer observations are available under 
this default definition. However, as our data set covers performance information from 
the economic downturn in the UK, sufficient observations are available to form a 
number of conclusions. The use of the two default definitions combined also allows 
us to test whether the drivers of repossessions are the same as the drivers of 90ever 
status. 
 
Information on both arrears and repossessions are available up until March 2009. As 
arrears and repossessions have only begun to rise since Q3 2007 the data only 
captures the first part of an economic downturn. Default drivers may evolve over time 
and different risk factors may become prevalent during a later stage of a downturn 
environment.  
 
Figure 1 summarises the default rates: percentage of loans repossessed (‘repossession 
rate’) and percentage of loans that were in 90ever (‘arrears rate’) by origination 
vintage. There are a reasonable number of repossessions and arrears in the dataset for 
model estimation purposes. As older vintages have had more time to go into 
repossession or arrears, we naturally see higher default rates as compared to more 
recent vintages such as 2007. It is worth noting that some of the differences are also 
transaction specific. For example, for the prime data the different vintages also have a 
different mix of transactions with different loan-to-values and debt-to-income ratios 
which may also be driving the results. This will be controlled for in the multivariate 
analysis. 8 
 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics on Key Risk Factors 
 
Before turning to the univariate analysis of default rate we analyse the distribution 
and historical development of those risk factors identified in the literature and in our 
analysis. 9 
 
3.3.1 Original Loan-to-Value Ratio (OLTV) 
The literature usually associates the OLTV with the willingness to pay since the 
leverage of the borrower indicates the degree of commitment to the investment. 
Between 2005 and 2007, UK lenders relaxed underwriting criteria to allow for 
increasingly high-OLTV loans (i.e. loans with particularly little equity by the 
borrower). This is evident also in our dataset with average OLTVs having increased 
                                                 
8
 The 90-ever rate for 2000-2002 vintage in non-conforming are very high, but resulted in very little 
repossessions. The number of loans here are very few and skewing the results. 
9
 Please note that summary statistics are not reported from this point hereafter where vintage 
information was missing.  
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between 2000 and 2007 from around 70% to above 80% in the non-conforming sector 
and from around 62% to 70% in the prime sector.10 Figure 2-4 show the distribution 
of OLTVs for prime and non-conforming loans, where it is quite evident that a higher 
proportion of loans were originated in the high OLTV bands in recent vintages. 
However, some of these high concentrations are driven by specific lenders rather than 
the overall trend.  
 
3.3.2 Debt-to-income ratio (DTI) 
A borrower’s ability to meet the monthly mortgage payment is dictated by the 
relationship between their income and the monthly payment. There are two widely 
used measures for the perceived affordability of a loan: the income multiple (IM) and 
the debt-to-income ratio (DTI). The IM simply expresses the size of the loan advance 
as a multiple of the borrower’s annual gross income.11 However, mortgage lenders in 
the UK are maintaining this measure only for provisional indications and have 
gradually moved towards DTI type measures to assess a borrower’s affordability. The 
DTI is viewed as a more precise measure of affordability since it takes into account 
the debt payments and net income. Lenders vary in their definition of the DTI ratio. 
For instance, monthly debt service payment may include or exclude liabilities other 
than the mortgage and income may be adjusted to reflect additional earnings and 
regular expenses. Based on the dataset we define DTI as the monthly debt service 
payment on the mortgage as a proportion of the adjusted monthly net income (net of 
taxes and national insurance contributions). Average DTI has also shown small 
increases over time as evident in Table 6. Figure 5-7 show the magnitude of impact 
more clearly whereby a much larger proportion of loans were originated in the higher 
DTI bands in recent vintages, especially in the case of prime.  
 
3.3.3 Loan and Borrower Characteristics 
Table 7-8 summarise key borrower and loan characteristics in our dataset. While we 
considered several more borrower and loan characteristics, those reported in this 
summary table are the ones that turned out significant in one of the logistic 
regressions.  
 
As might be expected, non-standard loan features are less prevalent among prime 
loans compared to non-conforming loans. Similarly, interest only loans are also far 
fewer among prime compared to non-conforming loans. Interest-only loans have been 
a fairly stable percentage of mortgage loans advanced in both prime and non-
conforming. However, more recent vintages of 2008 and 2009 are showing a drop in 
interest-only mortgages. Such loans implicitly rely on the ability of the borrower to 
manage the build-up of capital for the repayment of the loan at maturity or to 
successfully find a refinancing opportunity. In the buy-to-let sector, interest-only 
loans are the predominant form of repayment type due to tax reasons. Fast-track loans 
make up only 17% of all prime originations which indicates that the reliance on stated 
income was used by lenders sparsely, while the opportunity for borrowers to self-
                                                 
10
 Weighted average LTVs are higher  by 3-5% but the overall trends are preserved. We don’t report 
weighted average LTVs because the multivariate regressions are numbers based and weight each 
observation equally.  
11
 For example, a borrower with a loan of GBP 150,000 and an annual gross income of GBP 50,000 has 
an income multiple of three. 
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certify their income was a very popular product within non-conforming lending. The 
much larger percentage of remortgage loans among non-conforming lending (around 
60-65% of lending versus approx. 40% in prime) can be explained by the fact that 
some non-conforming lenders were specifically targeting borrowers in payment 
difficulties for this product, while remortgaging among prime lenders was mainly the 
result of a borrower seeking for a better interest rate.  
 
For non-conforming loans we also analysed additional available information on 
adverse credit characteristics of borrowers. Less than half of the borrowers in the non-
conforming datasets have adverse credit as per our definition. We have created an 
adverse credit flag which is defined as loans which have had a prior bankruptcy or an 
individual voluntary arrangement (IVA) or mortgage arrears 6 months ago or 
mortgage arrears 7-12 months ago or a county court judgement (CCJ). Therefore, 
adverse credit subsumes all the other categories that are listed in Table 8. Other 
borrowers in the dataset may have some adverse credit history that is not being 
captured by the four variables described in  Table 8.  
 
There is a sizeable proportion of borrowers who are charged with a CCJ over the past 
twelve months prior to loan origination. In the UK a CCJ is issued by the court when 
an individual has failed to make contractual payment on unsecured debt (for example, 
a credit card liability). We use information on the number and amounts of all CCJ to 
test for their impact on default probability. The percentage of loans with any number 
of CCJs ranges between 17-28% in the two datasets. Of these, while a large percent of 
loans with CCJs have a record of only one CCJ, there is still a sizeable number with 
more than one CCJ (approximately, 30-50%). The typical (median) amount of CCJ 
charges for any one borrower is at around GBP1000, while the average is at around 
GBP4000. In this case the average is skewed upwards due to very large accumulated 
CCJ charges for some borrowers which can go up to a maximum amount of close to 
GBP1 million. We also had information on the time elapsed since the last CCJ 
recording. However, the poor quality of this data prevented us from drawing any 
meaningful conclusions.  
 
4 UNIVARIATE AND MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS  
This section presents results from univariate and multivariate regression analyses 
using the default indicators and loan and borrower characteristics as introduced in 
section 3.  
 
4.1 Univariate Analysis  
These analyses help to gauge the potential predictive power of single risk factors and 
prepare the multivariate analyses presented in section 4.2.  
 
4.1.1 Original Loan-to-Value Ratio 
Borrowers with a higher amount of equity in their property (as represented by a low 
OLTV ratio) tend to be less often in arrears and repossession proceedings. Figure 8-10 
show a positively increasing relationship between OLTV and default for all vintages 
under study. For non-conforming loans we only report the three most recent vintages 
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where the dataset is sufficiently well populated. We included all vintages with more 
than 3,000 loans.12 The non-conforming data show a reduction of arrears and default 
rates at the highest OLTV bands, i.e. above 80% OLTV for arrears and above 90% 
OLTV for repossessions. It is likely that stricter underwriting procedures applied at 
the high LTV bands are responsible for this relationship, such that low-equity 
mortgages are approved only if the credit risk profile of the loan is low otherwise.  
 
Notice also that the worst overall arrears and repossession rates are recorded neither 
for the oldest nor for the most recent vintages, but for intermediate ones. The older 
vintages are less affected by the current downturn due to prepayments and substantial 
house price appreciation that has occurred since origination. The more recent vintages 
did not have time to build up the level of arrears and repossessions of the older 
vintages. The 2007 vintage, however, is expected to ultimately perform similar or 
worse than the 2005 and 2006 vintages.  
 
We note that the influence of OLTV is much stronger for repossessions than it is for 
90ever rates. This phenomenon points towards repossession proceedings being started 
earlier the less equity the borrower has in the property. We investigate this topic in 
more detail in section 4.2. 
 
4.1.2 Debt-to-Income Ratio 
Borrowers who are making larger mortgage payments as a proportion of their 
disposable income have higher default rates in both prime and non-conforming 
sectors. We do find again a flattening of default rates towards the highest DTI buckets 
in Figure 11-13. Similar to the discussion of OLTVs, this is likely to be related to 
stricter underwriting procedures in the high risk segments. Note also that the 
flattening starts at lower levels for prime mortgages (from around 30% DTI) 
compared to non-conforming mortgages (from around 40% DTI).  
 
4.1.3 Borrower and Loan Characteristics 
Table 9-11 summarise the relationship between the default rate and various borrower 
and loan characteristics. The statistically significant t-tests suggest that there are clear 
differences in default rates across many loan and borrower characteristics. For the 
continuous variables such as OLTV and DTI, we computed the Johnkheere-Terpstra 
test, which is a nonparametric test for ordered differences among classes. We 
distributed the OLTV and DTI in various bands and tested the null hypothesis that the 
distribution of the default rate does not differ among the classes. The test rejects the 
null hypothesis of no-trend among the OLTV and DTI classes.  
 
It should be kept in mind that univariate analyses do not fully capture relevant 
multivariate relationships. For example, buy to let loans here appear to have lower 
default rates compared to owner-occupied loans. This is due to the lack of control 
over other characteristics such as OLTV, DTI and other loan features. There are also 
vintage specific differences that are not captured in the analyses in this section. The 
                                                 
12
 While this threshold may appear arbitrary the model fit with fewer observations posed problems and 
the maximum likelihood estimation was not converging. 
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regression analysis reported in section 4.2 sheds more light on these more complex 
relationships.  
 
4.2 Multivariate Analysis 
Methodological Remarks 
We estimate the following logistic model to predict the factors driving probability of 
default of a mortgage loan. 
 
Pr(Default)= 1/(1+e-bx)  (1) 
 
Whereby b is the vector of coefficients to be estimated and x is the vector of risk 
factors, i.e. borrower characteristics, loan characteristics and control variables such as 
dummy variables for the originators. The disturbance term follows a logistic 
distribution with a fixed variance.  
 
We perform regression analyses on both the indicator for having ever been 90 days or 
more in arrears and the indicator for repossession. All key variables listed in section 
3.3 were used in a series of regressions, taking into account the limited availability of 
some factors for certain transactions.  
 
In addition, originator specific effects are introduced to control for differences in 
underwriting procedures across lenders. These qualitative differences can have a 
significant impact on the probability of default. Since originators may have sponsored 
several transactions with different collateral over time, we also introduce transaction 
specific dummies. This is especially important as transactions may contain different 
eligibility criteria.  
 
We test for the stability of the model with respect to different origination vintages and 
repossession periods. This way effects from changes in underwriting procedures, 
marketing, distribution channels or economic environment are tested more 
thoroughly. For example, the 2006 and 2007 vintages were originated at a time of 
fierce competition among lenders and may be expected to have resulted in the 
origination of riskier mortgage loans, all other characteristics of the loans being equal. 
Controlling by origination vintage allows to take into account any such time-specific 
effects.  
 
Interaction effects were also introduced to determine any risk-layering in different 
product and borrower types. We tested on a number of interactions, including various 
combinations between high OLTVs, self-certified, self-employed, adverse credit, 
remortgaging and interest-only loans.  
 
4.2.1 Results 
The regression results are summarised in Table 12-17. Separate estimations are 
performed for prime and non-conforming loans and within non-conforming separate 
analyses using the repossession indicator and the 90ever arrears indicator as the 
dependent variable. We report results for the entire dataset and separately for only 
those vintages with a sufficiently large number of observations, i.e. for non-
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conforming origination years 2005 to 2007 and for prime origination vintages 2004 to 
2007. We considered various borrower, product and loan characteristics for the 
regression analysis based on a priori expectations. Care was taken not to introduce 
correlated variables, for example flats (property type) and new builds. Some variables 
were only available for specific pools and regressions were carried out separately. 13 
 
We report marginal effects instead of coefficients for the exogenous variables to 
facilitate evaluation of whether their magnitudes are of economic importance. 
Marginal effect for a variable i is calculated as follows:  
 
Marginali = F (b’X + bisi) – F (b’X)  (2) 
 
In most cases, our key exogenous variables of interest are dummy variables such as 
product type (interest-only) or borrower type (e.g. self employed) that take on the 
values 0 or 1. For each of these variables, the reported marginal effect is the 
difference in predicted value for the dependent variable for a dummy value of 1 
versus 0 (i.e. si = 1), with all continuous exogenous variables evaluated at their means 
and categorical exogenous variables evaluated at their mode. For the continuous 
exogenous variables of OLTV and DTI, the reported marginal effects are difference in 
the predicted value for the dependent variable for a 10% increase from the mean value 
(i.e. si = 10%). For the continuous variable of stabilised margin, we report the 
marginal effect of a 1% increase in stabilised margin. We also report in the regression 
outputs F (b’X) as the ‘base’ probability of repossession/arrears where the continuous 
variables are evaluated at their means and the dummy variables at zero. This 
facilitates a comparison of the marginal effects also in relative terms compared to the 
base probability.  
 
The selection of the model was based on a combined consideration of several 
measures of goodness of fit, including log likelihood, Bayesian information criterion 
(BIC), Akaike information criterion (AIC), Somer’s D, pseudo r-squared and residual 
analysis in choosing the final model.14 We also carried out residual analysis for 
several sub-groups to see if the model fit is poor for specific segments in section 
4.2.2. Coefficients that were insignificant in the model have not been reported in the 
results.15  
 
Most drivers of default for prime are also relevant for non-conforming  
The regression results suggest that aside from adverse credit information (such as 
CCJ, bankruptcy orders, IVAs or prior arrears) which are characterising the subprime 
segment, we find very similar drivers of default in both sectors. High-OLTV loans, 
interest-only loans and remortgages are defaulting significantly more often than 
average for both prime and non-conforming.  
                                                 
13
 In addition to the variables in the final model, we analysed property type, region and the type of 
interest charged on the mortgage.  
14
 When analyzing data with a logistic regression, an equivalent statistic to R-squared does not exist.  
The model estimates from a logistic regression are maximum likelihood estimates arrived at through an 
iterative process.  They are not calculated to minimize variance, so the OLS approach to goodness-of-
fit does not apply.  However, to evaluate the goodness-of-fit of logistic models, we use pseudo R-
squared as reported by SAS which is based on log-likelihood.  
15
 We used backward selection to remove variables that are not statistically significant at or below the 
10% significance level.  
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We find that the larger loan-level impact of OLTV on arrears and repossessions 
compared to the DTI ratio holds for both non-conforming and prime loans. 16 This is 
in contrast to the study by May and Tudela (2005) who find the OLTV not to be a 
statistically significant driver of household payment problems. Several explanations 
allow to rationalise this phenomenon: Firstly, borrowers may consider the costs and 
benefits from continuing payment. If they have little equity, they will have less 
incentive to continue payments and may choose to default. Based on the 2004-2007 
vintages, the fact that income was (or was not) sufficient to meet the mortgage 
payments was of less importance, due to the fact that high house-price appreciation 
allowed borrowers to refinance to a larger debt amount.  
 
A second and more plausible explanation is the impact of an ‘underwriting effect’ 
over time. This effect is clearly visible in the negative influence of high DTIs on 
prime arrears, i.e. prime loans with a higher DTI are less likely to default.17 It appears 
that prime lenders apply strong restrictions on affordability in the underwriting 
process such that loans with the worst affordability measure tend to perform better 
than average as evidenced in the consistent negative coefficient across vintages. An 
example of this may be that loans with high DTIs are only approved to known private 
banking clients who have sufficient other assets and a strong payment history with the 
originator. We are unable to ascertain whether this hypothesis is true due to lack of 
data on the borrowers’ general financial position and their relationship with the 
mortgage originator.  
 
Drivers of repossessions are similar to drivers of arrears  
For non-conforming loans we are able to compare the results of 90ever arrears with 
the results from repossessions (see Table 14-15).  
 
We find that the same borrower and loan characteristics that influence arrears are also 
important in influencing repossessions. While to our knowledge there is no public UK 
study that compares the two, our results are in line with findings from the US reported 
by Demyanyk and Hemert (2009). They do not see any significant difference between 
their delinquency and foreclosure regressions.  
 
Two additional product features in the non-conforming market, however, appear to be 
significant drivers for repossessions, but not for arrears: loans made under the right-
to-buy (RTB) scheme and buy-to-let loans (BTL). While RTB and BTL loans do not 
necessarily have higher arrears compared to non-RTB and owner occupied, 
respectively, the roll rate for these loans into repossession is much higher. For BTL 
loans this means that among two borrowers who have been unable to manage their 
personal finances in the past those who are then trying to engage as property investors 
                                                 
16
 We also tested whether the predictive power of DTI as a measure of affordability is mainly due to it 
incorporating the size of the interest rate charged on the loan in the numerator. We find the evidence to 
be mixed (see 
 for prime regression results including stabilised margin). In most cases, when we include the stabilised 
margin over the Bank of England base rate into the regression, the DTI continues to be significant. The 
statistical significance of the stabilised margin itself is variable.  
 
17
 This is similar to the graphical analysis in 
Figure 7 which shows this effect. 
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are less likely to prevent repossession compared to those who purchased the house 
they are living in. BTL loans, which were found to be insignificant in the non-
conforming arrears regression model, are positively significant for the repossession 
model. The negative coefficient for 2007 BTL loans is suggesting that these loans are 
performing better than owner-occupied loans. However, this may again be related to 
the fact that we do not have enough performance history for 2007 originations to fully 
determine the effects of BTL.  
 
The results on RTB are likely to reflect the functioning of the scheme. Council tenants 
have the opportunity to purchase their own homes through the UK government’s 
scheme. This gives tenants the right of first refusal to purchase the home that they are 
renting from their local authority at a discount to the effective open market value. 
Should the property be re-sold within 5 years, the purchaser is liable to repay a 
portion of the discount, relative to the length of time since the property that was 
bought. Seasoned RTB loans of more than 5 years hence benefit from the discount on 
the property value which allows them to sell the property and repay all outstanding 
liabilities. More recent originations, however, do not have this option since they are 
still exposed to the liability against the local authority. Given the house price decline 
over the last years, it is thus likely that those borrowers are less likely to recoup all 
their liabilities from selling the property. Given also that borrowers in that scheme 
tend to be lower skilled, low-income earners, lenders are likely to see less chance of 
cure and start the repossession process earlier than usual. Moreover, the best houses 
were bought early on when the scheme was first introduced nearly 20 years ago. 
Arguably what is left and more importantly what is reflected in our dataset, are a 
portion of the least desirable housing stock. This might make selling the house to 
clear arrears higher as there may be a larger forced sale discount for this type of 
property.18 
 
Some variables have a different effect on likelihood of repossession than arrears 
In terms of economic magnitude of the drivers, we notice a slightly stronger influence 
of OLTV in the regression on repossessions, particularly the 2006 vintage. While the 
marginal effect for the 2005 vintage is stronger for 90ever, we are careful not to over-
interpret this marginal effect as relative to a ‘base’ probability of arrears of 23.8% for 
the 2005 vintage, the marginal effect on a relative basis is smaller. Moreover, the 
2005 vintage also has a small number of observations and poor model fit.19 We find a 
stronger impact of equity on the likelihood of repossession relative to the likelihood 
of long-term arrears. The results show that not only are high-OLTV loans (i.e. little 
equity in the property) more likely to fall into arrears compared to lower OLTV loans, 
once they are in arrears they are also more likely to be repossessed. This may be 
explained with the limited prospects of curing (potentially refinancing into a higher 
LTV product or via selling the property and prepaying the loan without default) that 
lenders see in loans that have fallen into significant negative equity that has built up 
due to the drop in house prices since origination.  
 
                                                 
18
 Note that these results only relate to non-prime lending. Our database does not contain RTB and 
BTL loans in the prime sector so that no comparison between the two sectors can be performed.  
 
19
 The goodness of fit measures: The AIC was lower than for other vintages and the Hosmer-
Lemeshow test was statistically significant at 10% level.  
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We find a less strong impact of DTI overall on both the likelihood of arrears and the 
likelihood of repossession. The impact of DTI is much weaker for the repossession 
regressions. In fact, it is insignificant except for the 2006 origination vintage.  
 
These findings contrast somewhat with the US study by Demyanyk and Hemert 
(2009) who also report results in terms of marginal effects. Their paper finds that 
marginal effects are consistently higher across all borrower and product 
characteristics for the probability of falling into arrears versus the probability of 
repossession.  
 
To ensure that the results were not influenced by the slightly different pools of loans 
which were used for the arrears and the repossession analysis, we analysed the effects 
on a reduced dataset among only those loans for which both 90ever arrears and 
repossession observations were available. This sample consists of approximately 
22,000 loans in total from various vintages (comprising of 842 repossessions and 
3,295 loans in arrears). In order to keep a critical mass of observations we did not 
separate vintages and estimated a single regression. The results (in Table 16) broadly 
match with those found for the broader sample. The only exceptions are BTL and 
RTB which cannot be included in the reduced sample because it does not contain any 
BTL and RTB loans.   
 
Adverse borrower features are the most significant relative to other borrower or 
product features  
The indicator for adverse credit history for a borrower is highly significant for both 
arrears and repossessions among non-conforming loans. In addition to OLTV and 
DTI, it seems to be the single most important factor that explains default behaviour in 
loans. Adverse credit borrowers have a higher probability of repossession in the range 
of an additional 5%-13%, with the impact similar for the 90ever regression keeping in 
consideration the higher ‘base’ probability of arrears (9%-24%) relative to the ‘base’ 
probability of repossession (0.3%-6%).  
 
Other borrower characteristics that are significant are self-employment and 
remortgaging. We were unable to include self-employment as an explanatory variable 
into the regressions on repossessions, as the number of observations for which this 
information was available was very low.  
 
Self-certification products that allow borrowers to certify their own income also carry 
the risk of fraud as has prominently been the case in the US subprime sector with the 
so-called ‘liar loans’. 20 We find a similar effect whereby loans where the borrowers 
self-certify their income have a higher probability of default all else being equal. The 
marginal effect however is much larger ranging between 0.2%-2% for our study, as 
compared to the US study by Demyanyk and Hemert (2009) who find a marginal 
effect between 0.25%-0.68% for low documentation loans. However, these are only 
absolute effects; we are unable to compare the effect in relative terms between the two 
studies due to the US study not reporting the ‘base’ probability of default. While the 
UK products have had a lower maximum LTV limit than the US, the results suggest 
                                                 
20
 In the non-conforming sector, borrowers were able to choose not to have their incomes verified. The 
lenders performed only varying degrees of due diligence, with some insisting on an accountant’s letter 
for self-employed borrowers and others making contact with the employer to confirm employment of 
the applicant, though income was not discussed. 
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that after controlling for this LTV limit, the products in the UK have been relatively 
more risky than the no (or low documentation) products in the US. We also found 
some evidence of risk layering, where other borrower and loan characteristics when 
combined with an impaired credit history leads to a further increase in the likelihood 
of default. We find the effect of self-certification and adverse credit history combined 
was larger than the cumulation of the two separate effects. The magnitude of the 
interaction effect is relatively small of about 1-1.5%, but statistically significant.  
 
In the conforming sector, there is no explicit self-certification product. Instead, some 
loans undergo a leaner review process (so-called ‘fast-track’) based on the lenders 
choosing, typically if the LTV is within a maximum limit and the borrower’s credit 
score is not exceeding a certain threshold. The regression results show that these ‘fast-
track’ products behave differently from ‘self-certification’. They also appear not to be 
comparable to low documentation loans in the US prime sector. Standards for the 
relaxation of income-verification tended to be more stringent among prime lenders in 
the UK. Our evidence shows that UK fast-track loans have a lower probability of 
default compared to fully income verified loans, though the economic magnitude is 
small.  
 
Interest-only loans are 0.8%-2% more likely to default than the ‘base’ probability of 
default. The effect on a relative basis varies across prime and non-conforming 
regressions but is in the order of between 7%-30%. Interest-only loans could pose two 
potential risks: (i) that the borrower is unable to make the interest payment upon 
maturity. Typically (though not generally monitored by lenders), borrowers build up 
an investment pool to make the bullet payment of the principal at the end of the term 
of the loan. However, there can be a risk of shortfall at maturity as the nominal value 
of the funds at maturity may be smaller than the outstanding balance on the loan; and 
(ii), that borrowers only select interest-only mortgages due to affordability constraints 
as they are unable to make payments for both capital and interest from their regular 
income. Note that the regression analysis only picks up the latter effect. This is 
because the data set does not span a long enough time to allow for observations of 
interest-only loans that have reached maturity.  
 
We also analysed second charge loans. While second charge mortgages were 
commonly available in the non-conforming sector, these loans only appear in our 
dataset in few of the transactions. For the 2006 vintage where the data were 
reasonably well populated we find second charge loans to be more likely to fall into 
arrears, but less likely to be repossessed as compared to first charge loans. We believe 
this effect is only a short-term anomaly related to different timing of repossessions 
between first-charge and second charge loans. Usually second charge loans take 
longer to be foreclosed, as the second charge holder must jointly work with the first 
charge holder in the foreclosure proceedings. Moreover, given that the loss severities 
on second charge loans easily amounts to 100%, it may be likely that lenders are not 
seeking to foreclose these properties immediately and first focus on repossessions on 
loans where substantial recoveries are more likely.  
 
Remortgaging shows relationship with default likelihood, but debt consolidation may 
be underlying driver  
An active market for mortgage refinancing is common for both the UK and the US. 
Frequent remortgaging is the result of strong competition between lenders, low 
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transaction costs (e.g. for stamp duties, estate agents, registration fees, prepayment 
penalties) and the lack of relationship banking. In an active refinancing market 
borrowers try to obtain a better interest rate or to extract equity from their property. 
The former is particularly prevalent where mortgages are taken out on teaser (or 
discount) rates. After the end of the discounted period, most borrowers ‘shop-around’ 
for a better rate. Extraction of equity can be done for various reasons, such as for 
investment in goods, but can also be related to financial difficulties of the borrower, 
as he or she tries to consolidate debt from other accounts. Cash-refinance has been 
found to be strongly related to delinquency and repossession in the US (Demyanyk 
and Hemert, 2009).  
 
Similar to Demyanyk and Hemert’s (2009) finding on cash-refinance, our regressions 
show loans for remortgaging turn out to be significantly more risky than loans 
extended for property purchase. It may be counterintuitive that remortgage borrowers 
appear to have a greater probability of default as many are only shopping for a better 
rate. We explored this in more detail and found that the significant coefficient is 
actually functioning not only as an indicator for ordinary remortgaging but also as a 
proxy for debt consolidation. Borrowers may withdraw equity from their home to 
consolidate (and repay) debts that they have built up. But since debt consolidation is 
rarely recorded as the motivation for remortgaging we are unable to clearly 
distinguish between debt consolidation and standard remortgaging. To carry out this 
check we re-estimated the non-conforming regression for the sub-pool where we had 
information on debt consolidation.21 Due to the small number of observations we 
estimated the regression using the entire dataset rather than separating between 
origination vintages. The results are overall inconclusive. On the repossession data we 
find a strong positive relationship between debt consolidation and probability of 
repossession, and remortgaging is no longer significant (Table 17). However, for the 
arrears regression the opposite can be found, i.e. the remortgage variable continues to 
be significant and debt consolidation is insignificant. 22 
 
For prime loans, we did not have information available on remortgage for all 
transactions under analysis.23 A separate analysis using fewer transactions supports 
the finding that remortgage loans have a higher probability of default. However, we 
do not have data on debt consolidation to verify the ultimate drivers of this effect (see 
Table 13).  
 
Finally, we do not find first time buyers to have significantly different probabilities of 
default when all other factors have been controlled for. For example, for first time 
buyers, their relatively higher OLTV could be capturing any differences in default 
probability. 
 
Trends over time mostly mild and as expected 
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 This sub-pool comprises of Bluestone 061, Bluestone 071 and Leek 21. 
22
 We also find some evidence of risk-layering between remortgagors and adverse credit history. While 
this coefficient was not robust across all vintages, it does suggest that remortgaging may have been 
used during these periods of house price rises (by all borrowers, but particularly adverse credit 
borrowers) to refinance out of financial difficulties.  
 
23
 This sub-pool excludes Granite only from the transactions listed earlier.  
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Some factors can be expected to be more relevant during economic distress than 
others. For this purpose regressions have been performed on annual origination 
vintages. Since the dataset spans only the origination vintages 2004 to 2007 for prime 
and 2005 to 2007 for non-conforming and default observations up until March 2009 
results on trends only refer to the time of the run-up to and the first part of the recent 
credit crisis.  
 
The regressions on prime loans confirm that self-employed borrowers are more 
vulnerable to economic decline than employees as their income is more directly 
related to the economic environment. The coefficient has continuously grown for each 
vintage up until 2007 from a marginal effect of 0.2% to 0.5%. While, the ‘base’ 
probability of arrears has also increased during this period, this effect is roughly 
constant if measured on a relative basis to the ‘base’ probability of arrears. The 
opposite observation can be made with interest-only loans for prime as its impact has 
declined from a marginal effect of 0.42% for the 2004 vintage to 0.14% for the 2007 
vintage.  
 
The most striking trend can be observed with respect to new build properties. Loans 
secured on new build properties appear significantly more risky than loans on older 
properties. This is visible, however, only for the 2006 and 2007 vintages; the latter 
only for 90ever arrears. The results indicate – as was recognised in the aftermath – 
that misincentives for this product were not prevalent during 2005 but grew 
tremendously in the subsequent years. We test additionally whether the riskiness of 
new build properties can be explained by incorrect valuations, since in addition to 
deposits and other incentives being provided by builders on new build properties, 
there was a systematic overvaluation of these properties. By implementing a reduction 
of the property value of 10% by way of raising the OLTV on new build properties, we 
find that the new build coefficient becomes insignificant.  
4.2.2 Residual Analysis 
We use Pearson residuals which are a component of the chi-squared statistic to 
identify if there are specific segments of the OLTV and DTI that are not well 
explained by the model. The Pearson residual for the ith observation is constructed as 
follows:  
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Where wi is the weight of each loan i and pi is the probability of default for loan i. In 
our case, every loan has the same weight (i.e. weight=1). Higher residuals for specific 
observations mean that the model performs a poor job in explaining the default 
behaviour for these loans. We computed the Pearson residual on a loan by loan basis 
for the regression models reported in Table 12, 14 and 15 and then computed the 
average (median, 1 percentile, 99 percentile, among others) for various OLTV and 
DTI buckets. As a further check we also compute the Kuipers Score. The Kuipers 
Score (KS), for two events with base probability of ½ each is defined as the difference 
between the proportion of correct predictions of an event and the proportion of false 
predictions when the alternative event occurred i.e. it is defined as the difference 
between the hit rate and the false alarm rate. Similar to the Pearson residuals, we 
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calculate the KS for each OLTV and DTI bucket. The higher the KS, the better is the 
prediction of the model for the subset analysed. 
 
The Pearson residual analysis are reported in figure 14-19 and Kuipers-Score are 
shown in Table 18-23. The results broadly show poor model fit (high residuals, low 
KS) for some of the low OLTV segments (0-40) and low DTI segments (<20%). In 
most cases we have limited data on extremely high OLTVs (>100%) and so we were 
unable to test for the model fit for this segment. In the prime data we find the KS is 
lower at the high OLTVs indicating a poor model fit for OLTVs>90%. Overall, 
though the performance of the regression model at higher OLTV and DTI is 
comparatively better than at lower OLTV and DTIs.  
 
5 Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
5.1 Key findings 
Our study broadly confirms many conventional assumptions on the relative default 
risk of UK mortgage loans. In particular, we find that some risk factors commonly 
viewed as most important for the risk assessment are indeed reliable predictors of 
relative risk for both the prime and the non-conforming sector, in particular the 
original loan-to-value ratio and to some degree the debt-to-income ratio. We also find 
that the separation into prime and subprime lending can be justified on the grounds 
that adverse credit information is a major predictor of default. Otherwise, standard 
indicators of relative risk, such as interest-only loans, self-certification and self-
employment can be confirmed in this study. The study does not confirm that non-
income verification as done for fast track mortgages in the prime sector is similarly 
detrimental as is the option of self-certification in the non-conforming sector.  
 
In addition we are able to show that most risk factors are robust to the default 
definition, i.e. there is no significant difference between the results on 90ever 
delinquencies and repossessions. This is helpful for future research as delinquency 
data are more abundant and leading indicators compared to repossessions which are 
recorded only with several months delay. Few exceptions to this are the limited 
explanatory power of the debt-to-income ratio and the strong positive significance of 
the indicators for buy-to-let and right-to-buy mortgages in the repossession data.  
 
Finally, despite the limited time span of our data history we can also identify some 
trends of risk indicators over time. For example, we identify an adverse trend with 
loans secured by new build properties towards the vintages 2006 and 2007 which can 
be attributed to a loosening of underwriting procedures at the time. We expect, 
however, that this has been reversed with the onset of the economic crisis and the 
subsequent significant tightening of underwriting criteria across all UK lenders. We 
also identify over time an increasing impact of self-employment on defaults which 
can be explained with a higher income sensitivity of self-employeds on the general 
economic environment compared to employees.  
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5.2 Comparison to other countries 
Mortgage markets can be very heterogeneous across the world. Loan products, supply 
and demand of housing and credit availability can differ substantially among the 
various structures of financial markets. While the focus of this paper is on the UK 
mortgage market, it is useful to compare the drivers of default identified in this study 
with experiences made in other countries. For this purpose we also studied loan-level 
data on mortgage performance from other countries. The data are less abundant and in 
some cases limited to only few originators per country, but still provide useful 
benchmark information to compare the results from this study with. A separate 
publication on the findings with more detail about the datasets and methodologies 
used is planned for the near future.  
 
Table 24 summarises some key findings (using logistic regression analysis) with 
respect to the predictors of default across various European countries and the US. We 
pool our results from internal Fitch Ratings studies with those from the Demyanyk 
and Hemert (2009) study on the US and Diaz-Serrano’s (2005) study on several 
European countries. While the US study is based on loan-level performance data 
using delinquency and foreclosure rates that covers half of the US subprime market, 
the European study uses a household panel survey for eight European countries that 
includes information on mortgage payment problems. Aggregating the findings across 
studies we find, surprisingly, that for the most part no major divergences between the 
findings for the countries exist, despite the heterogeneity in regulatory framework, 
market practices and cultural background. The two most important drivers across all 
countries are household equity and ability-to-pay. 24 
 
The key differences arise in terms of the effects of the various products and loan 
characteristics that differ across countries. In some instances similar products are 
riskier in some countries than others due to the differing structure of the mortgage 
market. For example, as the UK mortgage market is predominantly floating rate we 
do not find floating rate loans to be more risky than fixed-rate loans. However, in 
other European countries which have a mix of floating and fixed rate loans, the 
marginal effect of floating rate loans was statistically and economically significant.  
 
5.3 Future outlook  
Limitations of this study result mainly from having only four years of origination 
vintages with a sufficient breadth of observations and a limited number of years of 
performance information. One extension of this study would result from replicating 
this analysis once data are available over a longer time horizon. This would allow for 
insights into default timing by borrower and product type as well as the study of 
borrower behaviour throughout a business cycle at a loan-level. On a technical level – 
if supplemented with prepayment information – longer-running mortgage default data 
would allow the study of competing risks models which additionally capture the 
interdependency of default likelihood with likelihood of prepayment.  
 
As mortgage credit risk is driven equally by loss severities as it is driven by default 
rates a study on determinants of loss severities would provide a useful complement to 
                                                 
24
 Note: Diaz-Serrano (2005) do not include OLTV in the regression analysis due to data limitations.  
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this study. Such an analysis based on a similarly composed pool of data on defaulted 
mortgage loans in the UK is underway.  
 
Furthermore, a comparison to other countries would not only benefit the 
understanding of the UK mortgage risk but also help to develop a comprehensive 
understanding of risk factors across jurisdictions and market setups. Such a cross-
country study would lead to important insights into the dependency between the 
housing market framework and credit risk and could feed into policy 
recommendations of governments and financial regulators.  
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Tables and Charts 
 
Table 1: Number of Loans by Transaction Series  
Repossession 
Information
Arrears 
Information 
Bluestone 7,767                7,767              
Eurosail 16,231            
Leek 21,461              11,709            
Ludgate 1,447              
Mansard 3,271                1,935              
Money Partners 10,062              
RMAC 12,895              4,957              
RMS 13,053              
Total 68,509              44,046            
A. Number of Loans by Transaction Series  
(Non-Conforming)
 
 
Arkle             314,874 
Arran1               25,316 
Gracechurch               72,508 
Granite             285,159 
Total 697,857            
B. Number of Loans by 
Transaction Series (Prime)
 
 
 
Table 2: List of Transactions in each Transaction Series 
Transaction Transaction Series
Bluestone041 Bluestone
Bluestone061 Bluestone
Bluestone071 Bluestone
esail061 Eurosail
esail063 Eurosail
esail071 Eurosail
Leek 14 Leek
Leek 20 Leek
Leek 21 Leek
Ludgate061 Ludgate
Mansard061 Mansard
MPS1 Money Partners
MPS2 Money Partners
MPS3 Money Partners
MPS4 Money Partners
Rmac061 RMAC
Rmac062 RMAC
Rmac063 RMAC
RMS21
RMS
RMS22 RMS
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Table 3: Number of Loans by Origination Vintage 
Number of Loans Prime 
Repossession 
Information
Arrears 
Information
Arrears 
Information
Missing                2,599                   2                    -   
Pre 2000                   307                 15            48,302 
2000-2002                2,595               913            95,811 
2003                   966               966            59,071 
2004                1,656            1,999            88,615 
2005              12,503            4,295          120,586 
2006              31,710          27,779          188,080 
2007              16,173            8,077            97,392 
All 68,509             44,046         697,857         
Non-Conforming 
 
 
Table 4: Number of Loans by Year of Repossession 
Repossession Year Number of Loans % of Total
2004 2 0.07%
2005 92 3.39%
2006 407 15.01%
2007 977 36.03%
2008 1174 43.29%
2009 60 2.21%
 
 
Table 5: Average OLTV by Origination Vintage  
Non-Conforming Prime 
Repossession 
Information
Arrears 
Information
Arrears 
Information
Pre 2000 64.7% 75.5% 61.0%
2000-2002 68.7% 68.2% 62.4%
2003 72.9% 73.0% 62.0%
2004 72.7% 73.1% 64.8%
2005 73.5% 76.2% 70.6%
2006 77.0% 75.3% 70.1%
2007 81.9% 82.5% 69.3%
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Table 6: Average DTI by Origination Vintage  
Non-Conforming Prime 
Repossession 
Information
Arrears 
Information
Arrears 
Information
Pre 2000 30.1% 40.8% 30.0%
2000-2002 33.9% 30.8% 31.3%
2003 33.8% 33.7% 32.9%
2004 35.7% 35.2% 33.6%
2005 35.6% 35.0% 35.6%
2006 35.5% 36.8% 35.8%
2007 36.4% 37.2% 36.0%
 
 
Table 7: Distribution of Loan Characteristics  
Prime
Characteristics 
Repossession 
Information
Arrears 
Information
Arrears 
Information
Self Employed 31.3% 39.1% 10.8%
Self Certification 59.8% 61.4%
Fast Track 0.0% 0.0% 16.5%
Interest Only 
(owner-
occupied) 50.4% 50.3% 26.4%
Interest Only 
(BtL) 89.5% 90.8% 0.0%
Remortgage 
Loans 59.3% 57.2% 39.2%
Right to Buy 6.6% 18.9% 0.0%
Buy to Let 6.6% 6.5% 0.0%
New Builds 7.1% 6.1% 8.8%
Non-Conforming
 
 
 30 
Table 8: Adverse Credit Characteristics in Non-Conforming Sector 
Repossession 
Information
Arrears 
Information
Adverse Credit 26.1% 42.0%
Country Court 
Judgement 
(CCJ) 18.0% 28.7%
Arrears in the 
last 7-12 months 
before 
origination 7.2% 7.9%
Arrears in the 
last 0-6 months 
before 
origination 6.0% 5.9%
Bankruptcy or 
Individual 
Voluntary 
Arrangement 
(IVA) 1.5% 2.2%
Non-Conforming
 
 
Table 9: T-Tests - Repossession Rates by Product and Borrower Characteristics  
Non-Conforming 
Repossession 
Information
Y N T-Test significance
Self Employed 7.3% 3.8% ***
Self Certification 6.1% 4.0% ***
Interest Only (owner-
occupied) 6.5% 4.2% ***
Remortgage Loans 5.6% 4.8% ***
Right to Buy 1.9% 5.5% ***
Buy to Let 5.0% 5.3% NS
New Builds 10.0% 4.9% ***
Adverse Credit 7.1% 4.7% ***
Bankruptcy or 
Individual Voluntary 
Arrangement (IVA) 3.8% 5.3% **
Country Court 
Judgement (CCJ) 8.2% 4.6% ***
Arrears in the last 7-
12 months before 
origination 3.8% 5.3% ***
Arrears in the last 0-
6 months before 
origination 9.4% 4.9% ***
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Table 10: T-Tests – Non-conforming 90ever rates by Product and Borrower Characteristics  
Non-Conforming 
Arrears 
Information
Y N T-Test significance
Self Employed 24.4% 22.0% ***
Self Certification 26.1% 19.4% ***
Interest Only (owner-
occupied) 24.8% 22.4% ***
Remortgage Loans 28.0% 17.6% ***
Right to Buy 26.9% 22.8% ***
Buy to Let 20.8% 23.7% ***
New Builds 20.0% 23.8% ***
Adverse Credit 31.1% 18.1% ***
Bankruptcy or 
Individual Voluntary 
Arrangement (IVA) 18.9% 23.7% ***
Country Court 
Judgement (CCJ) 37.3% 18.3% ***
Arrears in the last 7-
12 months before 
origination 32.2% 21.8% ***
Arrears in the last 0-
6 months before 
origination 32.0% 22.0% ***
 
 
Table 11: T-Tests – Prime 90-ever Rates by Product and Borrower Characteristics  
Prime Y N T-Test significance
Self Employed 2.8% 2.3% ***
Fast Track 1.9% 2.4% ***
Interest Only (owner-
occupied) 2.9% 2.1% ***
Remortgage Loans 1.4% 1.1% ***
 
 
Table 12: Regression Results for 90ever Arrears on Prime Loans 
2004 2005 2006 2007 All Vintages
OLTV 0.48%*** 0.23%*** 0.54%*** 0.37%*** 0.66%***
DTI -0.10%*** -0.06%*** -0.11%*** -0.11%***
Fast Track -0.21%*** -0.15%*** -0.32%*** -0.27%*** 0.31%***
Self Employed 0.18%*** 0.14%*** 0.38%*** 0.34%*** 0.34%***
Interest Only 0.42%*** 0.16%*** 0.28%*** 0.14%*** 0.49%***
Pr(arrears)x at mean 1.17% 0.57% 1.58% 1.26% 1.70%
Transaction Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 88615 120586 188080 97392 697857
R-squared 0.1301 0.1065 0.0826 0.0511 0.0908
 
The table reports marginal effects from the logistic regression using >3 month arrears in prime sector as a 
dependent variable (intercept is not reported). The marginal effects for OLTV and DTI measure the effect of a 
10% increase in the explanatory variable, while marginal effects for stabilised margin measure the effect of a 1% 
increase in the explanatory variable. The categorical variable marginal effect represents the difference in 
probability of arrears when the categorical variable is 1 and 0. Pr(arrears) states the probability of arrears using the 
logistic regression parameters where OLTV, DTI are evaluated at their means and categorical variables at zero. 
***,**,* represent statistical significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels respectively.  
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Table 13: Regression Results for 90ever Arrears on Prime Loans: Including Remortgage and 
Stabilised Margin 
OLTV 0.50%*** 0.23%*** 0.18%*** 0.07%***
DTI -0.07%** -0.03%** 0.02%**
Remortgage 0.54%*** 0.28%*** 0.32%*** 0.05%***
Fast Track -0.32%*** -0.31%*** -0.13%***
Self Employed 0.05%* 0.10%*** 0.03%**
Stabilised Margin 0.24%*** 0.26%***
Interest Only 0.23%*** 0.08%*** 0.04%***
Pr(arrears)x at mean 1.09% 0.54% 0.50% 0.21%
Transaction Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 58187 56479 86057 53417
R-squared 0.0635 0.0655 0.0737 0.0559
20072004 2005 2006
 
The table reports marginal effects from the logistic regression using >3 month arrears in prime sector as a 
dependent variable (intercept is not reported). The marginal effects for OLTV and DTI measure the effect of a 
10% increase in the explanatory variable, while marginal effects for stabilised margin measure the effect of a 1% 
increase in the explanatory variable.. The categorical variable marginal effect represents the difference in 
probability of arrears when the categorical variable is 1 and 0. Pr(arrears) states the probability of arrears using the 
logistic regression parameters where OLTV, DTI and stabilised margin are evaluated at their means and 
categorical variables at zero ***,**,* represent statistical significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
Table 14: Regression Results for 90ever Arrears on Non-Conforming Loans 
2005 2006 2007 All Vintages
OLTV 5.02%*** 4.64%*** 1.21%*** 3.39%***
DTI 0.97%*** 1.08%*** 0.84%***
New Build 7.31%*** 3.81%**
Adverse Credit 13.37%*** 5.48%*** 8.02%*** 7.40%***
Remortgage 5.73%*** 1.82%*** 4.07%*** 2.42%***
Adverse Credit * Remortgage 3.84%*** 1.74%***
Self Certified 2.03%*** -1.62%*** 0.56%***
Adverse Credit * Self Certified 1.50%** 1.76%** 1.96%***
Self Employed 4.54%*** 1.48%*** 1.54%*** 1.20%***
Interest Only 2.4%** 0.9%*** 0.8%** 1.2%***
Pr(arrears)x at mean 23.8% 22.0% 9.1% 15.5%
Transaction Dummies Y Y Y Y
N 2993 19549 7086 30892
R=squared 0.1737 0.2393 0.0651 0.2223
 
The table reports marginal effects from the logistic regression using >3 month arrears in non-conforming sector as 
a dependent variable (intercept is not reported). The marginal effects for OLTV and DTI measure the effect of a 
10% increase in the explanatory variable. The categorical variable marginal effect represents the difference in 
probability of arrears when the categorical variable is 1 and 0. Pr(arrears) states the probability of arrears using the 
logistic regression parameters where OLTV, DTI are evaluated at their means and categorical variables at zero. 
***,**,* represent statistical significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels respectively.  
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Table 15: Regression Results for Repossession on Non-conforming loans  
2005 2006 2007 All Vintages
OLTV 3.31%*** 5.17%*** 0.13%*** 5.86%***
DTI 0.53%*** -5.57%***
New Build 3.23%* -3.48%***
Adverse Credit 3.92%*** 5.18%*** 0.97%*** 5.86%***
Remortgage 0.46%*** 0.84%*** 0.25% 2.46%***
RTB 1.28%*** 2.07%*** 2.09%***
BTL 1.05%*** 2.73%*** -0.18%* 0.77%***
Self Certified 0.16% 0.66%*** 0.10%* 0.81%***
Adverse Credit * Self 
Certified 0.52%** 1.15%***
Interest Only 0.37%*** 0.86%*** 0.11%** 0.89%***
Pr(Repossession)x at mean 2.29% 5.26% 0.37% 6.00%
Transaction Dummies Y Y Y Y
N 11902 29042 16173 65238
R-squared 0.1644 0.1376 0.11 0.1015
 
The table reports marginal effects from the logistic regression using repossessions in non-conforming sector as a 
dependent variable (intercept is not reported). The marginal effects for OLTV and DTI measure the effect of a 
10% increase in the explanatory variable. The categorical variable marginal effect represents the difference in 
probability of repossession/arrears when the categorical variable is 1 and 0. Pr(repossession) states the probability 
of repossession using the logistic regression parameters where OLTV, DTI are evaluated at their means and 
dummy variables at zero. ***,**,* represent statistical significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
Table 16: Regression Results for Repossession and 90ever Arrears in Non-Conforming: Reduced 
Sample  
Repossession 90ever 
Repossession 
Information
Arrears 
Information
OLTV 0.52%*** 3.07%***
DTI 0.06%*** 1.61%***
New Build 5.47%***
Adverse Credit 0.29%*** 9.91%***
Self Certified 0.05%* 0.61%
Adverse Credit * 
Self Certified 0.12%** 2.22%***
Remortgage 0.11%*** 2.08%***
Interest Only 0.12%*** 3.07%***
Pr(default)x at mean 0.30% 11.64%
Transaction 
Dummies Yes Yes
N 21950 21950
R-squared 0.2475 0.2223
 
The table reports marginal effects from the logistic regression using repossession and 90ever in non-conforming 
sector as a dependent variable (intercept is not reported). It uses a reduced sample of loans where both 
repossession and 90ever indicator were available. The marginal effects for OLTV and DTI measure the effect of a 
10% increase in the explanatory variable. The categorical variable marginal effect represents the difference in 
probability of repossession/arrears when the categorical variable is 1 and 0. Pr(defaults) states the probability of 
repossession/arrears using the logistic regression parameters where OLTV, DTI are evaluated at their means and 
dummy variables at zero. ***,**,* represent statistical significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels respectively.  
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Table 17: Regression Results for Repossession and 90ever Arrears in Non-conforming loans: 
Debt-Consolidation Test 
Repossession 90ever 
Repossession 
Information
Arrears Information
OLTV 2.77%*** 2.51%***
DTI -0.53%*** 0.49%*
Adverse Credit 2.05%*** 4.15%***
New Build 9.64%**
BTL 1.88%***
Self Certified 0.42% 0.85%**
Adverse Credit* Self 
Certified
1.00%*
Interest Only 0.79%*** 1.50%***
Remortgage 2.01%***
Debt Consolidation 1.23%***
Pr(default)x at mean 10.23% 2.71%
Transaction Dummies Y Y
N 9326 12773
R-squared 0.2575 0.1045
 
The table reports marginal effects from the logistic regression using repossession and 90ever in non-conforming 
sector as a dependent variable (intercept is not reported). It uses a reduced sample of loans where debt 
consolidation information was available. The marginal effects for OLTV and DTI measure the effect of a 10% 
increase in the explanatory variable. The categorical variable marginal effect represents the difference in 
probability of repossession/arrears when the categorical variable is 1 and 0. Pr(defaults) states the probability of 
repossession/arrears using the logistic regression parameters where OLTV, DTI are evaluated at their means and 
dummy variables at zero.  ***,**,* represent statistical significance at 1%,5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
Table 18: Kuipers-Score by OLTV band for Prime 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007 origination vintage 
models as reported in Table 12 
OLTV 2004 2005 2006 2007
0-40 0.013 0.013
40-50 0.015 0.098
50-60 0.031 0.013 0.002 0.245
60-65 0.155 0.011 0.053 0.244
65-70 0.258 0.022 0.041 0.079
70-75 0.173 0.096 0.078 0.147
75-80 0.194 0.170 0.204 0.124
80-85 0.245 0.201 0.177 0.176
85-90 0.176 0.237 0.172 0.177
90-95 0.188 0.131 0.066 0.079
95-98 0.152 0.087 0.035 0.025
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Table 19: Kuipers-Score by DTI band for Prime 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007 origination vintage 
models as reported in Table 12 
DTI 2004 2005 2006 2007
<=20% 0.394 0.344 0.462 0.367
20%-25% 0.425 0.494 0.506 0.457
25%-30% 0.461 0.449 0.406 0.341
30%-35% 0.380 0.404 0.349 0.362
35%-40% 0.400 0.351 0.318 0.237
40%-45% 0.390 0.316 0.292 0.194
>45% 0.380 0.302 0.265 0.203
 
 
Table 20: Kuipers-Score by OLTV band for Non-Conforming 90ever 2005, 2006, 2007 and 
combined origination vintage models as reported in Table 12 
OLTV 2004 2005 2006 All
0-40 0.153 0.224 -0.054 0.043
40-50 0.420 0.224 0.100 0.061
50-60 0.386 0.325 0.090 0.059
60-65 0.313 0.305 0.354 0.061
65-70 0.236 0.343 0.208 0.049
70-75 0.481 0.337 0.243 0.046
75-80 0.260 0.374 0.244 0.052
80-85 0.234 0.368 0.218 0.037
85-90 0.275 0.413 0.235 0.029
90-95 0.360 0.351 0.108 0.040
95-98 0.182 0.355 0.195 0.012
 
 
Table 21: Kuipers-Score by DTI band for Non-Conforming 90ever 2005, 2006, 2007 and 
combined origination vintage models as reported in Table 14 
DTI 2004 2005 2006 All
<=20% 0.354 0.412 0.022 0.080
20%-25% 0.272 0.387 0.107 0.097
25%-30% 0.286 0.385 0.227 0.100
30%-35% 0.320 0.396 0.284 0.111
35%-40% 0.258 0.395 0.115 0.125
40%-45% 0.346 0.396 0.200 0.143
>45% 0.378 0.332 0.230 0.140
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Table 22: Kuipers-Score by OLTV band for Non-Conforming Repossession 2005, 2006, 2007 and 
combined origination vintage models as reported in Table 15 
OLTV 2004 2005 2006 All
0-40
40-50 0.104 0.122
50-60 0.147 0.282 0.079
60-65 0.325 0.121 0.147
65-70 0.334 0.192 0.529 0.285
70-75 0.368 0.256 0.370 0.370
75-80 0.343 0.253 0.522 0.405
80-85 0.212 0.256 0.296 0.329
85-90 0.177 0.238 0.439 0.447
90-95 0.260 0.255 0.350 0.466
95-98 0.284 0.482 0.531 0.684
 
 
Table 23: Kuipers-Score by DTI band for Non-Conforming Repossession 2005, 2006, 2007 and 
combined origination vintage models as reported in Table 15 
DTI 2004 2005 2006 All
<=20% 0.212 0.523 0.563 0.598
20%-25% 0.357 0.380 0.305 0.501
25%-30% 0.290 0.382 0.371 0.463
30%-35% 0.319 0.350 0.606 0.473
35%-40% 0.341 0.405 0.204 0.499
40%-45% 0.342 0.387 0.386 0.503
>45% 0.285 0.403 0.442 0.528
 
 
Table 24: Cross-Country Comparison of Default Drivers  
UK US Portugal Netherlands Greece Germany
OLTV ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
DTI ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ NA ↑
Interest Only ↑ ↑ ↑ NA NA ↑
Remortgage ↑ ↑ NA NA ↑ NA
Buy to Let ↑ ↑ NA NA NA NA
Second Home ↑ ↑ NA NA NA
Self Employed NA NS ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
Self Certified ↑ ↑ NA NA NA NA
Variable Rate 
Loans NS ↑ ↑ ↑
NA (all loans 
variable rate) ↑
Fixed Rate 
Loans
NS (v. few 
long-term 
fixed rate 
loans)
↓ ↓ ↓ NA ↓
Adverse Credit ↑ ↑ NA NA NA NA
Flat ↑
↓ 
(condominiu
m)
NA NS NS ↓
Multifamily NA ↑ NA NS NS ↑
* NA=Data not available or the field was not relevant to the particular country; NS=Variable 
was not statistically significant at 10% or below; ↑ is where the variable increases the 
probability of default and ↓ is where the variable decreases the probability of default.  
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Figure 1: Default Rates by Origination Vintage 
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Figure 2: OLTV Distribution by Origination Vintage - Non-Conforming (Repossession 
Information) 
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Figure 3: OLTV Distribution by Origination Vintage - Non-Conforming (Arrears Information) 
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Figure 4: OLTV Distribution by Origination Vintage - Prime 
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Figure 5: Distribution of DTIs by Origination Vintage - Non-Conforming (Repossession 
Information) 
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Figure 6: Distribution of DTIs by Origination Vintage - Non-Conforming (Arrears Information) 
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Figure 7: Distribution of DTIs by Origination Vintage - Prime 
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Figure 8: Repossession Rate by OLTV Band – Non-Conforming (Repossession Information) 
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Figure 9: 90ever Rate by OLTV Band – Non-Conforming (Arrears Information) 
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Figure 10: 90ever Rate by OLTV Band – Prime (Arrears Information) 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0-40 40-
50
50-
60
60-
65
65-
70
70-
75
75-
80
80-
85
85-
90
90-
95
95-
98
OLTV Band
%
 
o
f L
oa
n
s 
>
=
3 
m
o
n
th
s 
Ar
re
ar
s
Pre 2000
2000-2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
 
 
Figure 11: Repossession Rate by DTI Band – Non-Conforming (Repossession Information) 
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Figure 12: 90ever Rate by DTI Band – Non-Conforming (Arrears Information) 
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Figure 13: 90ever Rate by DTI Band – Prime (Arrears Information) 
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Figure 14: Average Pearson Residuals by OLTV Bucket in Prime Model 
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Figure 15: Average Pearson Residuals by DTI Bucket in Prime Model 
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Figure 16: Average Pearson Residuals by OLTV Bucket in Non-Conforming 90ever Model 
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Figure 17: Average Pearson Residuals by DTI Bucket in Non-Conforming 90ever Model 
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Figure 18: Average Pearson Residuals by OLTV Bucket in Non-Conforming Repossessions 
Model 
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Figure 19: Average Pearson Residuals by DTI Bucket in Non-Conforming Repossessions Model 
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